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The obituaries of super-space-man Wernher von Braun 
earlier this year recalled his reaction when someone asked what 
it would take to put a rocket on the moon. "The will to do 
it," he said. It is a recipe that might equally apply to the 
installation of a Scottish Assembly in the old Royal High School 
buildings in Edinburgh. Astonishing that in the event, man-
kind's ultimate goal out in space should be more accessible 
than a spoonful of self government in Scotland. 
Only a year ago it seemed from almost any vantage point 
in Scotland that devolution was home and dry. Admittedly there 
were widespread reservations about the form of Assembly in 
the government's White Paper, and the bill which followed 
did not do much to win over this initial opposition. But, there 
was an equally widespread assumption that the principle was 
at least settled and the task ahead was how the long-awaited 
emancipation could be made to work. 
A year ago, all the political parties in Scotland were com-
mitted to devolution. In effect Scotland had completed the great 
debate and made up its corporate mind that the time had come 
for action rather than words. 
Then came the extraordinary series of Parliamentary 
manoeuvrings which threw the whole boiling back into the melt-
ing pot, and could conceivably have wrecked prospects for any 
reasonable form of devolution. There was a sudden affectation 
by English (and some Welsh) MPs of the three major West-
minster parties that all this business about devolution, and 
delegating authority from the centre, was being thrust upon 
them unawares. Such fundamental constitutional changes re-
quired deep and solemn study. Overnight, it seemed, Westminster 
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was peopled by champions of the Act of Union of 1707. The 
word went out on all sides - better not to have this strange 
un-Westminster-like device at all, than to get it wrong. It 
was something which should not be rushed. 
With such roundly enunciated evasions the sap was steadily 
drained away from the Scotland and Wales Bill as day after 
dreary day in the Commons the nit-pickers set about their 
destructive labours like so many deathwatch beetles. 
It is wonderfully warming to the conscience and the ego 
to defend what has come to be called "the integrity of the 
United Kingdom." Even more rewarding when this can be 
achieved by doing nothing - that is blocking the Bill rather 
than trying to find ways of making it work. At the end of 
the day, the original bill was shelved when the Commons 
exercised its democratic privilege to oppose a guillotine. 
In essence the bill was stymied by a lack of will in West-
minster. This seemed to derive more from the conventions and 
cloistered moods of the mother of Parliaments than from any 
rational appraisal of the bill or sensitivity for the feelings of 
the people of Scotland. The system that the Bill was designed 
to reform struck back in self-defence and disarmed the threaten-
ing mechanism. 
In Scotland this embarrassed the Labour Party and left 
them vulnerable to the charge that they could not deliver election 
commitments. It delighted the Tories who were never as a 
body devolutionists at heart. The Liberals, genuine Home Rulers, 
were originally annoyed by their parliamentary group's decision 
to vote against the guillotine,! but came to enjoy the place in 
the political sun that accompanied the Lib-Lab pact that was 
to follow. The Nationalists merely shrugged as they had been 
doing for two years and said, "We told you so." 
These attitudes were to harden as the year went by and 
the parties had time to sort out their thoughts in public during 
the conference season. Labour stuck doggedly to the claim that 
the delay was only a temporary hiccup. The party in Scotland 
and the government in Westminster were committed to establish-
ing a Scottish Asembly and this pledge would be fulfilled. This 
theme of reaffirmation was a result largely of the pressure being 
exerted by the Scottish National Party on seats in the West 
of Scotland- In several parts of Lanarkshire, for instance, SNP 
branches were being formed and flourishing where before Labour 
had reigned unchallenged and supreme. Disenchanted steel 
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workers were coming round to the view that one Westminster 
government was about as bad as another and that the SNP 
seemed to offer the only effective focus for Scottish problems. 
In the face of a quite startling move in this direction in some 
areas, the undevolved Scottish Council of the Labour Party 
took steps to strengthen the resolve of Mr Michael Foot as 
minister responsible for devolution. A delegation in June told 
him that failure to honour the party's manifesto commitment 
would be seen in Scotland as final proof of the inability of 
Westminster to cater for Scottish needs. It went on to recom-
mend separate bills for Scotland and Wales, revenue raising 
powers for the Scottish Assembly and curtailment of the "over-
ride" powers reserved to Westminster. 
By predictable contrast, the Scottish Tories took their lead 
from the lack of zest for devolution exhibited in parliament. 
They had always been, in the words of the old song, walking 
backwards to devolution and the lack of progress culminating 
in the guillotine impasse afforded an impeccable opportunity 
to rush headlong away from it. This hasty advance to the rear 
was of course artistically camouflaged in high-minded, patriotic 
rhetoric. Mr Francis Pym, the chief Opposition spokesman, 
condemned the languishing bill as devoid of any sound principle. 
He deplored the possibility of separation - an independent 
Scotland with its own cabinet, its own armed forces, its own 
foreign policy and its own border posts. In this context he 
suggested nationalism had proved in practice to be the greatest 
enemy of devolution. The extreme demands of the SNP had 
aroused fears that any change at all would amount to the first 
step on the road to independence. Then, without even a blush 
of acknowkledgment Mr Pym suggested that the whole issue 
of devolution should be referred back to an all party convention 
or a select committee of the House of Commons- a proposal 
made at least two years earlier by Mr Russell Johnston, leader 
of the Scottish Liberals. Mr Pym's sentiments and his solution 
was endorsed two days later by the party leader, Mrs Margaret 
Thatcher, and is now standard Tory doctrine. 
The SNP took the same view as was reflected in the advice 
of the Scottish Council of the Labour Party to Mr Foot. In 
their case, however, they saw no reason to give the government 
a second chance. They said simply that the collapse of the 
original bill was proof beyond doubt that a Westminster parlia-
ment would not meet the wishes of the Scottish people. With 
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that point of principle clearly demonstrated there was little to 
be gained from further dickering with variable formulas for 
devolution, so the party would concentrate its energies hence-
forth on the prime goal of independence. In pursuance of this 
policy the SNP parliamentary group refused to take part in 
talks with the government on proposals for a new devolution 
bilJ. This has been one of the sources of friction between the 
group and the party leadership in Scotland. Some of the home-
based nationalists consider that there is nothing to be lost by 
having talks, and conceivably some kind of gain could be made, 
if only further insight into government thinking· But, the 
parliamentarians, who after all have talked with the government 
before, believe any sharing of views would only be a waste of 
time. So now, the SNP which was once prepared to back a 
reasonable devolution bill as "a step in the right direction" 
is indifferent to the idea of an Assembly in Edinburgh. The 
MPs would probably support such a measure in the Commons, 
but the introduction of a devolution bill would not deter 
them from helping to bring down the goverhment if an issue 
of confidence arose. 
The Liberals, who were instrumental in the defeat of a 
guillotine motion in February, arrived as a result in a position 
of some influence, if not exactly power, in the matter. They 
were able to insist on a stronger devolution bill, as well as 
proportional representation in the direct elections to Europe 
and a workable phase III of the pay policy, as the price of 
parliamentary support under a Lib-Lab pact. The measures were 
for the most part similar to the recommendations of the Scottish 
Council of the Labour Party. They called for separate bills 
for Scotland and Wales, powers for the Scottish Assembly to 
raise revenues, and reduction of the powers of veto and inter-
ference by the Secretary of State and the House of Commons 
in Assembly affairs. This coincidence of view from Scotland 
should have some impact on the government's thinking and its 
handling of the new bill in Parliament. 
This leaves the imponderable of whether parliament in the 
1977 - 78 session will have enough will to carry a tougher 
devolution bill than it balked at last time. There is, on the 
one hand, the popular revolving door theory that the more 
decentralisation is incorporated to woo the Liberals and placate 
Scottish Labour, the more dissident left wingers in the south 
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will defect to join forces with the Tories in opposition to the 
bill. 
On the other hand, although Mr James Callaghan is unlikely 
to make devolution an issue of confidence for his government 
in the House he has already clearly told his parliamentary party 
that the consequence of losing the new bill would inevitably 
be an early general election. 
However this cookie crumbles, the result is bound to be 
marginal. There are for example very few Tories left who would 
be prepared to stand up for the count in favour of a new 
government bill. Mr Alick Buchanan-Smith, who resigned as 
Shadow Scottish Secretary, is by nature steadfast and true and 
is intellectually convinced of the need for an Assembly. He 
was bitterly disappointed by the right-about turn his party 
executed at Mr Pym's command, and now sees himself as the 
main guardian of the devolution idea in Tory ranks. He is 
motivated to some extent also by concern about the alternative 
if devolution dies by default. Then, he would anticipate an 
even stronger surge of nationalism in support of the SNP, a 
virtually irresistible demand for independence and the risk of 
disruption and strife. There is Mr Hector Monro, by nature 
a sportsman and gentleman who, having pledged his word, 
believes in keeping it. His constituency in Dumfries offers a 
neat comparison of UK priorities in the way that the M6 motor-
way merges into the dangerous A74 north of the border. He 
would have great difficulty with his conscience in voting against 
the principle of a directly elected, legislative assembly in Scot-
land. 
Mr George Younger, another man of integrity and a 
thoughtful politician, who also resisted the Tory whip on the 
second reading of the original bill might well react again if it 
seemed that his party was about to bury devolution for another 
generation· The other second reading rebel, Mr Malcolm Rifkind, 
who resigned as a front bench spokesman on Scottish affairs, 
has re-opened his options since the party conference pronounce-
ments of Mrs Thatcher and Mr Pym. Almost immediately he 
re-adjusted his stance to claim that Scotland and Wales cannot 
have devolution unless similar arrangements are made for 
England. It would be disastrous, he suggested, to have piecemeal 
constitutional reform which turned Westminster into an imperial 
parliament for Scotland and Wales, while retaining it as the 
sole parliament for England. His alternative was a devolved 
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assembly for England comparable with the improved version 
proposed for Scotland. On that basis, which he has submitted 
as a personal proposal to his own party leadership and Mr Foot, 
Mr Rifkind would be free to oppose outright any new govern-
ment bill that did not deal with English devolution. With no 
other committed Tories on the horizon the government might 
therefore be able to call on the support of three Opposition 
members for its new measures or, perhaps more realistically, 
to assume that they would not vote against the principle. 
By any calculation, the will of the House seems likely to 
remain weak on this issue. But possibly even more significant 
now is the lingering conundrum of how strong-willed the Scots 
themselves are about the long promised Assembly. It seemed to 
the detached observer that just about the time the English 
parliamentarians were deciding there was an urgent need to 
discuss this novel and revolutionary idea the Scots had talked 
themselves out on the subject. The pros and cons of powers 
over industry and the economy, Willie Ross or any successor 
at St. Andrew's House as a Governor General, or what to do 
about the universities - all this had become more of a yawn 
than a new frontier. The national inclination to yawn coincided 
with growing problems of inflation and unemployment. The age-
old fears of an economic catastrophe and loss of jobs began to 
take precedence in many homes over the political niceties of 
constitutional reform. It also seemed that more and more people 
were concerned about the cost of establishing yet another tier 
of government when the recent reform of local authorities 
seemed to have led only to higher rates and a more expensive 
bureaucracy. There was certainly no sense of public outrage 
when the devolution bill was slipped into cold storage after the 
defeat of the guillotine. 
There was an inclination in some of the news centres south 
of the border to look for violence on the streets when the bill 
ground to a standstill. Might not the Tartan Army take action? 
There were bound to be demonstrations were there not? Nothing 
as it transpired could have been further from the placid facts. 
A rare enthusiast muttered in a pub "Good riddance" or "Well, 
it's not good enough you know, they'll have to do something." 
It was left to the party activists to pick up the pieces and to 
juggle with them as it might best suit their own direct interests. 
Even the party that was formed largely out of despair at the 
inadequate terms of the original White Paper of November 
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1975 - Mr Jim Sillars' breakaway Scottish Labour Party - sank 
steadily in the public opinion ratings. 
With no very immediate sign of an uplift in the economy 
that might release more energy for political causes it is con-
ceivable that the cause of devolution could continue to decline· 
No will in parliament stopped progress last time, no will at 
home base could bring about a final downfall for the concept 
of a legislative assembly in Scotland. 
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1. A guillotine motion is a timetable motion which enables a government 
to cut short the debate on each clause of a bill at a prearranged 
time. The government failed to carry the guillotine on 22nd February. 
By then the House of Commons had finished debate on only four 
of the 115 Clauses in the Bill. They had used up four days in Second 
Reading Debate and ten days in Committee stage. The government 
had originally offered thirty days of its time for the debate and was 
offering, as an inducement to the House, to give it a guillotine, a 
further twenty days. The Leader of the House, Mr Foot, told the 
Commons that this was the largest allocation for any Bill since the 
Government of India Oct forty years before. 
